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SYNOPSIS: Ground expansion and finally sliding occurred in one corner of the 25 m deep open 
excavation for the powerhouse. The movement occurred in a slickensided claystone overlain by water 
bearing sandy gravel. The cause was expansion of the claystone followed by its weakening from water 
pressure in the open slickensided cracks. The excavation was finally stabilized by drainage plus 
reinforced sloping walls restrained by cable anchors in the rock below. The paper summarizes the 
pertinent soil and rock properties and describes the analyses of the movements, the corrective 
measures and their varied performance, an9 the professional lessons to be gained. 
INTRODUCTION 
The S aguling project is the largest 
hydroelectric plant in the Republic of 
Indonesia. It is in West Java, about 100 km 
southeast of the Capital, Jakarta, and about 
40 Km west of Bandung, a large industrial and 
commercial center. The Citurum River rises in 
a ring of volcanic mountains in West Java. 
The mountains interrupt the flow of moist air 
from the Indian Ocean and producing high 
rainfall within the Citurum watershed. The 98 
m high dam creates the reservoir just upstream 
of the river's fall through a narrow canyon 
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Fig. 1 Profile of the Citurum River 
between mountain ridges on its way to the sea. 
The water is directed around the canyon in 
twin tunnels 6 km long, down a mountainside in 
twin penstocks in a cut as deep as 25 m ( 82 
ft}, and into the Powerhouse, developing 385 m 
(1270 ft} of head. The installed generating 
capacity is 700 megawatts ini tial.ly with a 
potential. capacity of 1400 megawatts in 


































Fig. 2 Layout of Principal Project Components 
The major project components are the river 
diversion tunnels, the rockfill dam with an 
earth core, waterway tunnels, surge tanks 
steel penstocks, power house, and switchyard. 
They extend for about 8 km across low 
mountains and narrow valleys occupied by rice 
fields, teak plantations, and occasional 
jungle, with numerous small villages connected 
by narrow winding roads. The principal 
component layout is shown in Fig. 2. 
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..;onstruction required roads for access and 
housing for personnel, beginning during site 
exploration and continuing through 
construction and eventually for project 
operation. 
The design was largely complete in mid 1980 
af.ter about 5 years of planning and 
investigation . Construction commenced in 
September 1981 and was virtually complete in 
1985. The project has been generating power 
for more than two years, and is a key 
component of the national electric power 
company, PLN. 
Geotechnical Problems During Construction 
Both the site geology and climate present 
problems for engineering design and 
construction. Most were anticipated and 
overcome without incidents. However, 
landslides were an intermittent hazard to 
construction works and a cause of construction 
delay and additional cost. 
The site geology is complex. Most of the site 
formations have a volcanic origin. Many are 
intrusions and indurated volcanic ash; others 
are sediments derived from the erosion and 
redeposition of volcanic/materials in the sea 
or in a shallow lake basin between the 
mountains. The formations are comparatively 
young: the oldest of Tertiary age and the 
youngest contemporary accumulations of silt 
from the muddy streams and volcanic ash from 
still active nearby volcanoes. 
There is local limestone of Tertiary Age 
formed during periods of land subsidence that 
alternated with violent uplifts of the land. 
Tectonic forces produced folding and tilting 
of these young formations, with some of these 
forces remaining to confound engineers and 
geologists. Because of recent tectonic 
movements, many of the more brittle tuffs and 
similar rocks contain networks of cracks. 
These are both surfaces of weakness and 
confined aquifers in which water pressure 
reduces effective normal stress and shear 
resistance. 
The climate is hostile, particularly to land 
stability and durability of engineered 
construction. The average rain of 2320 mm or 
91 in. comes largely during the 6 month wet 
season, beginning in late November and ending 
in April or May. Rainfall can be extremely 
intense, including violent thunderstorms. The 
dry season alternates between periods of no 
rain of several weeks long periods of 
predominately dry weather with occasional 
short wet periods. As a result humidity 
ranges from moderate to very high, and 
fluctuates rapidly during the dry season. 
The temperature is uniformly high, 30 to 35 C 
during the day and 18 to 20 C at night. 
Because of the high rainfall and warm 
temperature, rock weathering occurs rapidly. 
The near surface soils and rock either remain 
saturated or become saturated during the rainy 
season. Standing water in rice fields and 
irrigation of all crops during the dry season 
aggravates the water problems. 
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The combination of complex formations makes it 
difficult to accurately characterize the soils 
and rocks and to analyze stability. Similarly 
the environmental changes causing weathering 
and pore pressure increases are difficult to 
quantify. Therefore, all of the stability 
problems were not anticipated in project 
design . 
Objective of Paper 
Despite the geologic and environmental 
conditions it has been possible to identify 
some of the complexities after failure has 
occurred and to determine how to avoid similar 
problems in the future. Although instability 
accompanied excavation at many project 
locations, this paper is limited to 
instability in the Powerhouse excavation. The 
failures have been previously described by 
Maru and Shaw, 1984. The purpose of this 
paper is to describe the movements, evaluate 
the difficulties with their evaluation, and to 
show what changes are needed in our 
engineering methods to improve our technology. 
Fig. 3 The Powerhouse Excavation Looking 
Northwest with the Limestone Ridge 
in the Background, January 1983, 
with the Anchored Concrete 
Restraining System under 
Construction 
THE POWERHOUSE SITE 
The Powerhouse is a narrow flood plain and 
alluvial terrace on the right bank of the 
river, where the canyon broadens and the slope 
decreases. The river surface is normally El. 
253 m {835 ft), the flood plain, El. 255, and 
the terrace El. 265, 12 m or 40 ft above the 
river. Just south of the site a narrow 
irregular limestone ridge with steep slopes is 
cut by the ri.ver. The ridge crest i.s about 
200 m or 660 ft south of the Powerhouse and it 
rises to about El. 395, 130 m or 430 ft above 
the terrace. To the north, the land slopes 
steeply upward to about El. 700 or 2310 ft. 
The waterway tunnels exit on this slope and 
feed twin steel penstock tubes which drop 
northwestward i.nto the powerhouse. Figure 3 
shows the excavati.on looking north from the 
lower penstock toward the limestone ridge. 
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Fig. 4 Powerhouse Plan 
The Powerhouse plan is shown in Fig. 4 and a 
typical cross section through one of the 
turbine-generator units in Fig. 5. Its long 
wall is parallel to the river. The penstocks 
enter the site from the southeast corner, 
bifurcate and turn toward the river. In order 
to minimize cavitation the turbine scroll 
cases are well below river level. This 
required excavation to EL. 232 m, 33 m or 109 
ft below the terrace for the draft tubes and 
to El. 240, 25 m or about 83 ft below the 
terrace for the general excavation including 
the penstocks. 
WEST 
Fi?· 5 Powerhouse Cross Section 
Soil and Rock Conditions 
EAST 
The soil and rock conditions were explored by 
seismic refraction profiles, boring with 
intermittent soil samples and continuous rock 
coring, and shallow test pits. Laboratory 
tests for index properties of soil and for the 
strength of the rock cores were made to define 
engineering properties for project design. 
Geologic cross sections were prepared showing 
the elevations of the strata boundaries for 
both design and construction planning. 
Fig. 6 is a typical excavation cross section, 
from the contract drawings, depicting three 
distinct strata. A sandy gravel terrace, 
about 10 m thick is uppermost. It consists of 
cobble to fine gravel-size rounded particles 
of limestone, sandstone, and some volcanics, 
with a matrix of sand and partially bonded by 
silt and clay. Below is massive claystone, 
15 to 30 m thick. It is well indurated, 







Contract Design for Excavation Cross 
Section 
obvious fissile structure. The clay minerals 
are dominantly kaolinite and illite. Deeper 
horizons of the claystone are calcareous, and 
contain some montmorillonite. The plasticity 
of the remolded reworked claystone is low, and 
is classified as CL, even those horizons 
containing montmorillonite. The stratum is 
firm to hard with unconfined compressive 
strengths of 5 to 45 kg/em • The cores show 
the claystone to be cut by numerous fissures, 
with random orientations and spacings of 
between 10 and 100 em. Many of the fissures 
are slickensided, as illustrated in Fig. 7. 
Fig. 7 Slickensided Claystone from Vicinity 
of the October 1982 Slide 
Beneath the claystone is a soft limestone also 
of Tertiary Age. It has the strength of poor 
concrete, and is relatively massive with few 
fissures. 
The boundary between the terrace and claystone 
dips down gently toward the river to the west. 
The boundary between the claystone and 
limestone dips down to the east and south, so 
the claystone rapidly thickens in that 
direction. 
The limestone ridge appears to be supported on 
the claystone with the boundary between the 
two materials dipping gently to the southeast. 
Discrepancies in formational boundaries to the 
north and east suggest some faulting. 
However, the fault surface has not been 
identified. By way of contrast with the 
deeper limestone, the ridge contains numerous 
steeply dipping fissures which have been 
enlarged by solution and are filled with soft 
red residual silty clay. 
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Ground Water 
The ground water table is typically in the 
lower sandy gravel about 2 to 4 m above the 
claystone, and slopes downward toward the 
river. It is fed by rainfall infiltration and 
by springs that exit along the base of the 
limestone ridge at its contact with the 
claystone below. 
Excavation Requirements 
The designers adapted the site elevations to 
the harder lower claystone and the limestone 
in order to provide a sufficiently rigid 
foundation for the power house machinery. The 
optimization of support and excavation 
dictated the powerhouse orientation. However, 
with the limestone falling off to the 
southeast, deep excavation was required in the 
upper claystone for the penstocks where they 







The contract drawings depict the powerhouse 
excavation to be sloping with intermediate 
berms as shown in Fig. 6. The cut faces were 
to be restrained during construction by 
concrete facings anchored into the claystone 
and the limestone. After the structures were 
complete, the excavation was to be backfilled 
and the anchored facings would have no further 
·function. The basis for the design slopes and 
the anchoring is not given, but it is presumed 
that the claystone and limestone strengths 
included with the contract documents .were 
considered. 
Contractors Excavation Plan 
The contractor's excavation plan differed 
somewhat from that of the designer. First, 
the level of the terrace surface, El. 265 m, 
was extended to the north 70 m or 230 ft by 
cutting into the south face of the limestone 
0 100ft 
NOTE: EXCAVATION SLOPES AND BERMS 
FOR SEPTEMBER SHOWN: ACTUAL SLOPES 






Fig. 8 The May 1982 Cracking and Bulging 
1570 
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ridge to provide a space for an aggregate 
crusher, stockpiles, and the concrete batch 
plant. This required cutting a near vertical 
face as deep as 20 m into the limestone. 
Second, the excavation perimeter was enlarged 
to provide more gentle slopes in the claystone (2.7 H to 1 V) instead of the 1 to 1 slopes 
depicted in the contract documents. The 
objective apparently was to minimize or 
eliminate the need for the anchored facings. 
There were no formal drawings nor engineering 
computations to support these changes, but the 
high unconfined compressive strengths of the 
claystone, as given in the contract documents, 
probably were considered. 
MAY 1982 MOVEMENT 
Description of Failure 
By May 1982 the excavation had reached El. 244 
m, a depth of 20.7 m or 68 ft, reaching the 
upper surface of the limestone over much of 
the site. As the excavation approached this 
level, extensive cracking and bulges gradually 
developed in the slopes of the northeast 
corner, and in the level work area further to 
the north and east. These are shown in Fig. 
8. Springs developed in the excavated slope 
at the contact between the gravel terrace and 
claystone. 
The cracks were tensile openings with little 
or no evidence of vertical displacement. Most 
were arcuate as well as discontinuous, with 
their general trend parallel to the excavation 
faces. The excavation faces bulged upward and 
outward toward the excavation. However, there 
was no evidence of overall translation of the 
cracked materials in a downhill direction. 
Cracking to North 
A search was made for more widespread 
cracking. Some additional tension cracks were 
found in the bench cut for the aggregate and 
batch plant to the North. Cracks with 
vertical or shear displacement were found near 
the top of the limestone ridges nearly 200 m 
to the North, and directly above the steep 
face of the limestone cut for the aggregate 
and batch plant bench. Because there had been 
no previous search for cracks, it is not known 
whether these cracks were caused by the bench 
cutting or by the powerhouse excavation. The 
evidence of insects nest in the cracks 
suggests that the cracks occurred before 
powerhouse excavation. The springs at the toe 
of the bench excavation continued to seep 
despite the end of the wet season. 
Analysis of Failure 
New tests were made of the claystone to define 
its shear strength in more detail than can be 
deduced from the unconfined compression tests. 
The results for saturated samples in 
consolidated-undrained shear with pore 
pressure measurements (effective stress) are 
23 to 28 deg, c' 
kg/cm2 (4 samples) 
13 to 15 deg, c' 
kg/cm2 (3 samples) 
0.14 to 0.31 
0.65 to 1.05 
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Back analyses were made of the northeast 
corner slope assuming that it had undergone 
landsliding with a circular cross section. 
The circle was presumed to intersect the top 
of the slope at an observed crack and the toe 
of the slope, as shown in Fig. 9. The 
subdivision of the claystone into two units, 
slickensided and calcareous, is based on new 
borings made in the cracked zone. 
Unfortunately there was no evidence of a 
failure surface in the continuous core 
samples; the circular failure was assumed for 
convenience in computation. The ground water 
levels were deduced from open wells drilled 




Fig. 9 cross Section of the May 1982 
Movements 
The back analysis can be satisfied by various 
combinations of ~· and c' ranging from ~'=30, 
c'=0.3 kg/cm2 to ~'=15o, c'=l.O kg/cm2. The 
designers arbitrarily selected an 
intermediate, conservative combination for 
analysis of corrective measures: ~'=22° and 
c'=0.26 kgjcm2. 
Counter Measures 
Various countermeasures were planned by the 
designer after discussions with the contractor 
to increase the "safety factor of 1", presumed 
in the failure back-analysis, to 1.2. These 
measures included drains to reduce the ground 
water level and H-piles to augment the shear 
resistance of the presumed failure surface. 
First, the slope was re-excavated to sounder 
claystone with few cracks, as shown by the 
dashed line in Fig. 9. Eleven pit wells were 
excavated through the sandy gravel and about 
half a meter into the claystone. These were 
built as concrete box caissons. 
Eight 250 mm or 10 in. diameter drilled wells 
were installed in the northeast corner between 
the excavation and the concrete plant, spaced 
20-40 m apart. These were extended 2 m into 
the limestone. Each· included a 50 mm thick 
gravel pack throughout the depth to provide 
for rapid infiltration. The locations of both 
sets of wells are shown in Fig. 11, the plan 
of the October sliding. 
Horizontal drain holes 10 m long and 50 mm in 
diameter were planned for the slopes at three 
different levels to provide additional 
drainage for the claystone and gravel. 
Flattening of the slopes was considered, but 
space was not available. 
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The designers analyses based on the 
arbitrarily selected shear parameters showed 
that even with drainage, additional shear 
resistance of 44 tons per meter of slope were 
required for the desired computed safety 
factor of 1.2. Four rows of 200 x 200 mrn (8 
in) H piles were planned. (They were later 
enlarged to 350 x 350 mm [14 in.].) The piles 
would penetrate about 2 m into the limestone 
to fix them against rotation. They were stiff 
enough to resist bending from the resisting 
force applied at the level of the assumed 
circular failure surface. The number of piles 
was based on adding the shear strength of the 
steel at its intersection with the failure 
surface, to the shear resistance of the soil. 
For conservatism the number of piles required 
was doubled. No consideration was given to 
pile claystone shear transfer nor strain 
compatibility. The locations of the pile 
rows, two on each of the two intermediate 






8' H PILl! 
CROSS SECTION PLAN 
(REINFORCING NOT SHOWN) 
Fig. 10 H-Piles and Capping Beam 
The piles on each berm were connected together 
by steel angles in a simple truss and encased 
in a reinforced continuous concrete beam, as 
shown in Fig. 10. The purpose of this beam 
was to provide some resistance against 
rotation of the tops of the piles and to 
transfer loads between areas of greater and 
less movement. 
Critigue of Correactive Measures 
The analyses upon which the corrective 
measures were based were flawed. First, the 
available evidence never showed that a 
landslide had occurred. The ground bulged 
upward and outward, without accompanying 
subsidence and with neither toe bulges nor 
scarps. No shear surfaces were identified. 
Instead, the movement appeared to be the 
result of soil expansion, probably with 
movement along the existing slickensides, and 
caused by the stress release from excavation. 
Later tests showed the claystone to be 
expansive, wi~h expansive pressures of more 
than 2.5 kg/em • 
The deep wells were too remote from the 
expansion zone to effectively drain the 
slickensided cracks irl. the claystone and the 
pit wells could only lower the water level in 
the gravel. The horizontal drains planned 
were too short and too widely spaced to drain 
the random claystone cracks. Worse, their 
installation was hal ted, when only a few of 
those first installed produced water . 
Excavation of the loosened material steepened 
the slopes and added to the stress release and 
unbalanced loads in the excavation face. 
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r· ~na.l.ly, tne res1stance o:t tne 1:1-p11es 
depended on the assumed location of a sliding 
surface and on adding the shear of the steel 
to the shear of the soil without regard to 
load transfer or strain compatibility . 
OCTOBER 1982 SLIDING 
Failure Description 
Slow bulging and cracking continued while the 
corrective measures were being installed. A 
failure occurred in the northeast corner with 
rapid movement on October 18 , 1982. By way of 
contrast with the May cracking , movement 
developed suddenly, and included both 
subsidence at the top of the slope and bulging 
at the toe . It commenced two days after a 
very intense rain, following two months of 
very dry weather. Fig. 11 shows the northeast 
corner of the excavation, with the distortion 
of the truss connecting the H-piles. 
Fig. 11 Buckling of the Truss Connecting the 
H-Piles by Sliding in the Northeast 
Corner of the Excavation 
Most of the countermeasures planned following 
the May cracking and bulging had been 
installed. Installation of horizontal drains 
had been temporarily stopped because they 
produced little water. The concrete capping 
beam for the piles had not been constructed; 
however, this beam was never considered in the 
analyses for added stability . 
The toe of the slope bulged outward 1 to 2 m; 
the top of the slope subsided a few em, 
opening and extending the previous cracks. 
The major movements were in the center of the 
slope where the surface moved more than 1 m 
horizontally down slope, accompanied by deep 
cracking and by local subsidence and upheaval, 
as the claystone mass distorted. 
The greatest vertical displacement occurred 
just downhill of the upper line of H-piles. 
This displacement was accompanied by a 40 m 
long arcuate scarp and an open crack 50 to 100 
mm wide. Downhill, wedges of claystone moved 
differentially to form an elongated graben. 
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Fig. 12 Plan of the October 1982 Sliding and Earlier Drain System 
A plan of the excavation showing the cracking 
and bulging in the northeast corner as well as 
two smaller, unrelated slides along the upper 
west slopes is shown in Fig. 12. 
The H-piles were dragged downslope with the 
movement, but very non-uniformly. The upper 
rows moved a few em and tilted downslope only 
slightly. The truss and the tops of the piles in the lower rows moved downslope up to 1.7 m 
accompanied by partial buckling of the truss from bowing as shown in Fig. 11. Most of the H-piles til ted downhill, one 18 degrees from 
the vertical, Fig. 13a. The H-piles offered 
some resistance, but the claystone cracked and 
tore around them, Fig. 13b. 
Excavation into the toe of the slope disclosed 
a well defined failure surface. It continued 
to move about 1 em per hour two weeks after 
the major movement. 
Investigation 
The site conditions at the time of the failure 
were investigated by the designer and by the Author as a consultant to the owner. A number 
of pertinent facts emerged. 
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There was no evidence of new cracking or 
movement at the aggregate-concrete plant nor in the limestone ridge above. The movement 
was confined to the northeast corner of the 
excavation. The area involved was smaller 
than and within the area of the May cracking. 
A few of the drain wells were producing water, 
most were not. The water table rose 1 m following the intense rain in an observation 
well in the sliding zone, then fell slowly. One of the shaft wells filled with water following the rain and remained full several hours before it could be pumped down. Unfortunately, the caisson walls, excavated into the claystone, had no drain holes to bleed water out of the gravel terrace aquifer. About 1 out of 5 of the horizontal drains produced water (not unusual for horizontal drains). 
The H-piles did not penetrate into the limestone as specified. Instead, they stopped 
abruptly at the top of the calcareous 
claystone, penetrating into it only 1 to 3 em. This failure to drive the piles as specified had been overlooked by the designer and was a 
surprise when it was uncovered. 
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Fig. 13a H-Pile Til ted 18 Deg from Vertical 
and Heave of Claystone on Slope from 
the October 1982 Slide 
Fig. 13b Claystone Tearing on the Downhill 
Slide of an H-Pile from Slope 
Movement in the October 1982 Slide 
The tilt of the piles were equivalent to the 
horizontal movement of their tops. This shows 
that they had tilted as stiff members, 
rotating about their tips, driven just into 
the calcareous claystone. 
Added Testing 
Additional soil tests were conducted on 
samples of the slickensided claystone. The 
earlier tests had all been of intact 
claystone, between the slickensided cracks. 
The new tests were of the slickensided cracks. 
There was a startling contrast with the 
earlier tests: the effective friction angles 
were about 12 to 15 deg with little or no 
cohesion. 
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Swell tests were conducted of both the 
slickensided and calcareous claystone: Free 
swell~ 2 to 20%; swell pressure 0.2 to 2.6 
kg/em . 
The swelling in low plasticity claystone is 
probably the result of residual stress. It is 
likely that the slickensides and residual 
stresses were caused tectonically. 
Mechanism of Movements 
A cross section of the October slide is shown 
in Fig. 14. The earlier analyses had 
presummed a circular cross section of 
movement, as shown in Fig. 9, and repeated in 
Fig . 14. However, the pile tilting and ground 
movement indicate that the motion was nearly 
linear. A near horizontal surface probably 
followed the upper limit of the calcareous 
claystone, connecting with the surface cracks 








Cross Section of Sliding in the 
Northeast Corner of the Excavation 
The movement developed in two stages. First, 
excavation without support allowed the 
claystone to expand, opening the slickensided 
cracks within the mass and producing cracks in 
the ground surface. Second, ground water and 
surface runoff penetrated the opened cracks, 
developing pressure. The weakened mass 
expanded horizontally. Expansion was resisted 
by the friction on the cracks (reduced by pore 
pressure) and the resistance of the crack 
asperities. The H-piles possibly prevented 
the sliding from becoming catastrophic. 
However, they tore the slickensided claystone 
and their lack of embedment caused them to 
tilt and aggravate the cracking. 
Corrective Measures 
Further corrective measures were designed 
considering that no additional space was 
available for flattening slopes and that the 
construction of counter measures must be 
within the capabilities of the powerhouse 
contractor and Indonesian based contractors 
because of the time required to mobilize 
foreign contractors or to import materials. 
The new data on rock expansion and the 
continuing movements in the northeast slope 
indicated that further expansion of the 
claystone would be likely with further loss of 
strength. 
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Fig. 15 The Final Excavation Support System 
A concrete block, initially restrained by gravity-friction on the limestone was designed 
to support the northeast corner. Tie back 
tendon anchors were added when the block 
moved. Its limited resistance was confirmed 
when the strength data on the slickensides in 
the claystone became available. Most of the 
excavation was supported by sloping concrete 
walls restrained by tendon anchors into the 
calcareous claystone and the limestone. At 
the bottom of the south end of the excavation, 
vertical tied back walls were added because of limited space. These were installed using 
slurry supported excavations with the slurry 
replaced by concrete. These measures are 
shown on Fig. 15 and Fig. 16. 
Small Slides 
Two smaller slides occurred in the upper parts 
of the excava.tion face shortly after the intense rain of October 13--one at the north 
end of the east slope and one near the south 
end of the east slope. Their locations are 
shown in Fig. 12. Both were confined to the 
sandy gravel stratum. The cause was excess pore water pressure and weakening of the dried 
cla_y bonding in the terrace materials. 
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Further movement was prevented by horizontal 
wood lagging supported by steel H-piles driven as cantilevers into the claystone below. 
System Performance 
No significant movements occurred in the final 
support system. The excavations have been backfilled to provide level parking and 
service areas around the plant. No movements have been noted during 2 years of operation. The cost of the failures and their correction has not been fully identified. Beyond the direct costs are the cost of delay and of 
acceleration. The estimated total cost Probably exceeded $10 million. 
Fig. 16 Constructing the Anchor Concrete 
Facing Walls to Support the East 
Excavation Slopes 
CONCLUSIONS 
Water pressure in the slickensided claystone 
was the cause of the movements in the powerhouse excavation slopes. Although the 
slickensides were recognized, their 
significance was not understood either by those who identified them and those who made 
analyses and designs. Eventually, the 
excavation slopes were stabilized, but at 
considerable additional cost and delay. 
These failures and their correction provide a 
number of valuable lessons for our profession. These include both technical details and broader issues of interdisciplinary action. 
Technical Issues 
Small fractures that are insignificant geologically can play a key part in soil and 
rock strength. Testing intact portions of fractured soil or rock is grossly misleading. The strength and rigidity of the mass is largely controlled by the fractures; therefore 
testing should concentrate on these defects. 
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Residual stresses play an important part in 
the design of structures to support the 
ground. This has been recognized in tunnel 
support engineering; it is largely ignored in 
earth pressures on walls and excavation 
support systems. 
The residual stress influences the design 
three ways. First, if no allowance is made 
for movement, the lateral pressure can be 
greater than the vertical stress produced by 
soil or rock weight. Second, depending on the 
rigidity of the soil or rock, considerably 
more movement will be required to reduce the 
lateral pressure to the active state than is 
required for materials with gravity stress 
alone. Such large movements can be 
intolerable in some situations. Third, the 
stress release allows existing cracks to open. 
Those that were initially watertight can 
accept water, allowing pore pressures to act 
on the cracked surface. This changes the mass 
behavior as was demonstrated in the Saguling 
sliding. Such residual stresses have been 
largely ignored in geotechnical engineering, 
because there have been no convenient ways to 
measure them. With the modern techniques of 
hydraulic fracturing and the various 
dilatometers that can be introduced in bore 
holes, engineers can now measure residual 
stresses and include them in their analyses. 
Back .analysis of a failure must be based on 
accurate information on the kinematics of that 
failure. If the presumed motion is in error, 
conclusions based on an analysis of the 
erroneous motion will also be wrong. If the 
nature of the movement cannot be determined, 
then many possibilities must be evaluated--a 
form of parametric study. The corrective 
design then is adapted to the range of 
answers. 
Analyses of soil-structure interaction must 
consider the relative rigidities and strengths 
of those materials that control their 
interaction. Assuming that a pile contributes 
shear resistance to a landslide equivalent to 
the shear strength of its steel is wrong when 
it does not consider the possibility that the 
pile will shear the soil instead. 
Drainage design must recognize that real 
aquifers are highly variable. The failure of 
some drain holes to find water should not 
discourage the installation of more drain 
holes; one hole draining a key aquifer may be 
sufficient. 
Broader Issues 
Meaningful interaction between engineers and 
geologists is essential. The geologists 
recognized the slickensiding in the mudstone; 
they did not fully understand their 
engineering significance. The engineers were 
informed of the presence of the slickensides, 
but didn't visualize how they controlled their 
design. The geologist gave the slickensided' 
soil samples to the laboratory. The 
laboratory tested the intact material between 
the slickensides because it was difficult to 
trim specimens that included the weaknesses. 
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No one informed the laboratory staff of the 
s:i.gnificance of the slickensides. Thus the 
importance of the cracks fell through the 
cracks between the different viewpoints of the 
geologists, the laboratory engineers, and the 
design engineers. Instead, geotechnical 
engineers must have an understanding of 
geology and engineering geologists must have 
an understanding of engineering design. 
Unfortunately, :i.nterdiscipl:i.nary understanding 
appears to be decl:i.ning instead of improving. 
Jurisd:i.ctional jealousy between professions 
can destroy all, as union labor has 
demonstrated. The combined knowledge and 
wisdom of all relevant professions are 
required to solve the complex problems in 
geotechnical engineering. 
What is economical or practical design in one 
area at a particular time may not be in 
another because of local resources of 
manpower, money, and technology. The H-piles 
failed to restrain mudstone partially because 
they could not be installed as the design 
required. The deficiency was ignored because 
the contractor had no means to drive them 
further. The design must fit the resources 
and capabilities of the moment. 
Failure in a c:i.vil eng:i.neering is more than a 
problem; it is an opportunity. Fa:i.lure is the 
only full scale test of any large eng:i.neering 
system. As a test, it provides valuable 
lessons to the profession. 
As professionals, we should take advantage of 
the lessons; otherwise, the failure may be 
repeated. Moreover, we have already paid for 
the lessons. 
The Saguling Project has survived its 
powerhouse movements and is now generating 
power as its design anticipated. 
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